SMALL PAYLOAD OPPORTUNITIES ABOARD SOVIET LAUNCH VEHICLES
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The Space Commerce Corporation of the
U.S. and Technopribor of the Soviet Union
have agreed to develop jointly and market a
new commercial mobile launch vehicle derived
from
Soviet
SS-20
medium-range
missile
technology.
The Soviets have indicated they could
produce 300 launchers within a five-year
pe riod follow ing a go-ahead deci sion.
The
launcher could be employed for commercial
payloads or scientific research, including
materials processing experiments.
President Gorbachev reiterated in his
speech at Stanford University on June 4, 1990
the commitment of the Soviet Union to convert
military armaments to peaceful commercial
purposes.
He recognized the requirement to
develop
international
legal
safeguards
against potential mil itary use evol ving from
converted armaments.
The Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency is likewise concerned with
the START vehicle and these issues will need
to be resol ved.
In addition to the development of a
small relocatable launch vehicle there are
opportuni ties to have accommodation payloads
placed aboard other Soviet launch vehicles.
In
November,
1989
Energetics
Satellite
Corporation placed an order for $54M. Their
SAT/TRAC satellites will be placed into
geosynchronous orbit by Proton launchers.
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THE START LAUNCHER
The Space Commerce Corporation and Technopribor of the
Soviet Union signed an agreement in Moscow on October 11, 1989.
The
Memorandum
of
Understanding
established
the
working
relationship
between
The
Space
Commerce
Corporation
and
Technopr ibor to develop and market a new small launcher to be
named START.
Technopr ibor is anew ly formed organiz ation that control s
the SS-20 mil itary production complex.
The joint proj ect would
allow the Soviet Union to transition its SS-20 production
facilities and work force into commercial activities.
It will
utilize technology, systems and manufacturing complexes that are
not required to be destroyed under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
forces (INF) treaty.
Label ed the "Conversion One Proj ect" by the Sov iets, START
could become the first step in the practical implementation of a
long-term process.
Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, has
directed the transformation of the nation's military-industrial
complex into commercial activities.
START will be a newly designed vehicle.
It will not
incorporate parts of existing SS-20 missiles which have been
destroyed under the INF treaty. However, former SS-20 production
facilities in the Soviet Union will be used to build the new
launchers.
Components developed for the SS-20 may also be
utilized.
The SS-20's guidance system may be upgraded and
reprogrammed, for example, into an orbital guidance system.
The faring size will be approximately l800cm by 1300cm
narrowing to 800cm. The three-stage, solid fuel launcher will be
capable of carrying, for example, a 350 kg payload into a 400 km
orbit at 30 degrees inclination.
According to preliminary
specifications, START will weigh 40-45 metriC tons and will have
an overall length of 20 meters, making it sl ightly larger than
the two-stage, 16.49 meter SS-20.
As with the SS-20, the START booster will be mounted on a
mobile transporter/launcher vehicle, enabl ing it to be launched
from a variety of sites without special launching padS.
The
significance is that the launch vehicle can be brought to the
satellite and not vice versa as is the current practice.
It
would also enable launches from locations that currently do not
have established launch complexes.
Being able to "relocate" the
launching site enables the mission planner to achieve a
particular orbit giving due consideration to safety and cost.
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MARKET ANALYSIS
Estimated costs will be $10,000-16,000 per payload lb., or
$4-5 million per launch. START would compete for low Earth orbit
commercial payloads with the other small launch vehicles.
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To determine the commercial profitability of the START
launcher, SCC conducted a market analysis including an extensive
survey of prospective experimenters and research organizations.
Our census of experimenters identified 332 separate payloads
that, if funded, could be ready to fly in the 1990s.
About 20%
of these are payloads f rom foreign organizations, pr imar ily in
Canada and Europe.
About 30% are payloads sponsored by various
U. S. domestic and mil i tary programs.
The remaining 50% are
sponsored by U.S.
civilian government agencies or private
resources.
Some of these pay loads are pI anned as fully integr ated
spacecraft that would require only launch servlces.
Most,
however, are just an experimental apparatus that must rely on
support subsystems suppl ied by the launch service or some third
party.
It may be necessary to design and supply a standard
spacecraft buss structure including power and other subsystems in
order to sell START launches to these potential customers.
Many of the experiments included in our customer survey will
require mul tiple flights to complete their research work.
Including these reflight requirements, the payloads that we have
identified total about 600 nfl igh t needs n dur ing the 1990 s.
However, because several experiments typically share a single
spacecraft bus, this assessment of nflight needs" does not
translate to a specific number of launches.
U. S. domestic payloads users were surveyed in more detail
because they represent the majority of all small commercial
payloads which could be launched into outer space by the START
vehicle during the 1990s.
A sample of these U.S. domestic
payloads surveyed indicates that the two scientific research
areas with the largest number of identified experiments are:
1.

basic physics and astronomy (sponsorship shared by the
U.S. military and civilian (NASA) space programs); and

2.

microgravity/materials
processing
basic
research
(primarily supported in the U.S. by the center for the
Commercial Development of Space).

Figure 1 shows the resul ts of a survey of potential START
customers by broad scientific areas for U. S. domestic payloads.
It is important to note that the communications segment
represents only identified appl ications for technology which is
already been demonstrated to work.
Research programs supporting
the communications area, such as atmosphere effects on signal
propagation, are counted as physic experiments.
WHO PAYS FOR THE LAUNCH
Considering hardware development costs for U. S. domestic
users only, which we estimate to be about 80% of the entire START

commercial market dur ing the 1990s, approximately 60% of these
payloads are built entirely or partially by u.s. civilian
government agencies.
The U. S. Department of Defense sponsors
another 35% of these payloads. Thus, hardware development funded
exclusively by private capital make up less than 5% of the number
of
experiments
surveyed.
However,
private funding
also
participates in cosponsor ing an addi tional 5% of the payloads
with the civilian government program (NASA).
Thus, private
capi tal appears to be invol ved in building only about 10% of the
payloads SCC has identified in this study.
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of this funding for U.S.
domestic payloads.
These statistics reflect the number of
payloads, and hence the number of launches that could be
anticipated on the START launch vehicle. They do not reflect the
dollar investment by any of the sponsors.
This becomes
especially important when "in-kind" support and facility sharing
arrangements by industry and goverrunent are taken into account.
This type of sharing arrangement is not included in our analysis.
It is clear, therefore, that the vast majority of all u.S.
domestic payloads are buil t using goverrunent funds.
Therefore,
in order to be commercially successful, the START project must be
able to launch U.S. domestic payloads.
SCC reached this
conclusion and as a
resul t,
expanded the scope of
the
international marketing study to include an analysis of the U. S.
legal and regulatory regime controlling:
1.

the use of the START launch vehicle
States for U.S. domestic payloads; and

in

the

Uni ted

2.

the use of the START launch vehicle from launch si tes
outside the United States with payloads, or payloads
containing U.S. components.

HOW MANY ACTUAL FLIGHTS
Although the SCC survey found over 300 potential payloads
for the START launch vehicle, our assessment indicates that, at
current price levels, only 15% - 20% of these can be expected to
reach active flight ready status, given current program plans and
funding support.
This estimate is partially confirmed by survey
responses that 59 payloads (18%) are now manifested. These small
payloads can be carried both on expendable launch vehicles, and
as secondary payloads on the Space Shuttle.
It is important to remember that as a salesman must make
many contacts to sell to a few customers, so also do ideas for
experiments in space become a smaller number of actual launches
which could be accompl ished by START.
ACCOMMODATION PAYLOADS
your

The potential START launcher is only one method of getting
small satellite into space.
The Energetics Satellite
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Corporation of Englewood, Colorado signed a contract with SCC in
November, 1989.
The SAT/TRAC satellites will be part of the
SAT/TRAC Geolocation system.
The technology, al though novel in
concept and application, utilizes predominately noff-the-shelf n
components to generate position information and relay the data to
users.
The system's major components consist of a simple relay
type satellite, a ground-based computer processing and data
distribution
center
and
numerous
end
user
transponders.
Transponders attached to or carried by any vehicle, object or
individual can be located within 50 feet.
The contract provides prices for launching up to eight
satellites on the Proton launch vehicle.
The reason for the low
price of $54M for the entire constellation is because they will
be accommodation launches.
The 480 pound satellites will be put
into geosynchronous orbit in pairs.
They will npiggy backn on
one of the ten to twelve Proton launches the U. S. S. R. util izes
each year to boost its own communications satellites into GEO.
The cost to the Sov iet Union is nominal.
The only cost in
real ity is the integration and mating of the satellite to the
rocket.
Preliminary quotes from the insurance industry are 12%
for the Proton vs. 16-18% for other large launchers.
Another alternative for satellite owners is to place several
satellites on a launch vehicle such as the Cyclone to go into low
Earth orbit. For instance, it can place 4000 kg into a 200 km by
70 degree incl ination.
The faring size of the Cyclone is 2300cm
by 5900cm.
It can be launched for $15M, depending upon the
services required by the customer.
As of April 1, 1989 there
have been 73 successful launches out of 75 attempted.
POLICY ISSUES
SCC has al ready discussed and will continue to di scuss the
legal
ramifications of
the proj ect with
the U. S.
State
Department,
Arms
Control
and Disarmament Agency,
On-Site
Inspection Agency and other interested government agencies.
For
the project to move forward, the possible conflicts with the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty will have to be
resol ved.
Soviet officials noted that the conversion process would
require the developnent of administrative and legal tools and
safeguards to ensure against possible military use both actual
and perceived.
The Soviets have indicated that START tacilities
woul d be open to inspection.
Technopribor will provide Space Commerce Corporation with a
detailed technical description of the START mobile launch vehicle
complex within 90 days of a decision to proceed.
Each launch
compl ex consists of a launch vehicl e, a launcher container,
transporter and support equipment.
Design work on the launcher
will be completed in six to nine eighteen months after starting.

When decision is made to proceed with the project, flight
testing of the launcher would begin approximately one year. Ten
test launches are tentatively planned to be conducted in the
Soviet Union as well as other sites around the globe.
We would
I ike to conduct some of the test launches f rom Canada, Austral ia
and Brazil.
We will also seek Department of Transportation
approval to conduct a test launch in the U.S.
As this paper is being written, the new space launch policy
of the Bush Administration has not been released by the National
Space Council.
However, the prel iminary indication is that the
appl ication to the Department of State by Uni ted Technologies
Corporation to work with the Cape York Space Agency and the
Soviets in Australia will be approved.
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This is the first break in the U.S. policy against
permitting American satellites to utilize Soviet launchers. The
policy issue appears to be two aspects of technology transfer.
The initial concern was that the Soviets might learn valuable
secrets from being near a satellite buil t in the U. S.
(The
Administration apparently believes the PRC is not as capable of
discovering these secrets.)
The corollary concern of the government is the possibility
of the proliferation of launch technology to nations that
cur rently do not possess such information.
If these are, in
fact, the concerns of the Bush Administration and not merely
protection of the U.S. launch industry, the START launcher could
be utilized countries possessing launch technology.
In the past the primary impediment to using Soviet launch
vehicles has been the U.S. policy preventing export of satellites
manufactured in the U. S.
The vehicle for implementing this
pol icy has been the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
The ITAR defines all satellites as munitions. This subjects them
to the scrutiny of war materials whose export is governed by the
Arms Control Act.
The applicability of these rules to an export application
for a satellite with open technology has not been tested. If the
design of a satellite has been publ ished in open literature and
the information is available to the public (except for applicable
copyright protection), the technology transfer argument would
fade away like the grin on the Cheshire cat.
CONCLUSION
In this time of changing policies the satellite builder and
operator should keep the options open, both in design criteria
and desired launch service provider. The one thing certain about
U.S. government policy is that it will change. The adroit space
operator will be prepared to seize opportunities as they arise.
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